

The JSCP, the Sec Def & the Pres

~~Rand Corporation.~~

I ~~had just~~ joined Rand permanently in July of 1959, having spent the summer of '58 there as a consultant. In the summer of '59 I chose as a focus of my research the command-control process for nuclear forces. This was a question which was coming to seem of increasing importance as people studied the process of the alerting of nuclear forces in the event of an oncoming nuclear attack and the implementation of an execute order by the President.

In the fall of 1959 CINCPAC (the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific), who was at that time Adm. Harry Felt, called for a study of the command and control process of nuclear forces in the Pacific to be done in Hawaii, under his command. The Office of Naval Research organized the study under Dr. John Wilkes who threw together researchers from a number of non-profit research corporations working for the Defense Department and I was asked to join this from the

There was a need, of course, to familiarize ourselves with the planning for nuclear operations in the Pacific. Nuclear operations in particular are generally very closely guarded to a specific group of operations and command planners, people in J-3 and J-5 sections -- J-3 is operations and J-5 is plans -- who specialize in nuclear war planning. And since these are an elite of planners and operators the military secrets are very closely guarded; but, in particular, guarded even from civilian authority. At the same time they are plans that are known to quite a large number of military individuals, since ultimately they go down to the level of pilot and carrier operators and base commanders. So that at any given date there is only a small fraction of all military and civilian officials who are aware of these plans, who have access to them, but if one looks world-wide the number of people who have access to one or more is a very large number, in the tens of thousands.

Also, at each level of authority there are a number of people who are aware of the plan at the next higher level which governs that plans of the subordinate commander. So even in a given theater one runs into hundreds of people who have a pretty good knowledge of the structure of plans relating to that theater. This includes a handful of civilians, mainly operations analysts, left over from World War II, who work at improving the operational details and work directly with the military. In effect, they are employees of the military. But aside from them, very

few civilians, and in particular civilian officials, know anything about these plans.

We asked on the study to have access to these plans and to various other documents within the CINCPAC command, and we were given this access. Since we were among the few people to work at the base on some of these, we asked and were given permission to have access to the Top Secret "cage" in the Plans Section of CINCPAC Headquarters so that we could work late at night and on Sundays, since they were not willing to let us sign these documents out to our offices. This cage-entrance was literally a cage covered by heavy wire netting, guarded by a warrant officer and a guard who was a librarian. Inside, the cage, was the size of a small library room; had many shelves of documents and a filing system. In the course of reading the current plans I began to look up their references to various other documents and to become gradually aware of the structure of plans. I became interested in the subject, since it was obviously a little-studied area and thus one that offered every hope of improvement by a comprehensive look and analysis.

It turned out that CINCPAC got most of the JCS documents, which were sent routinely to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific, so that it was possible there to see plans that related to other theaters as well, and higher level plans. I compiled a list finally of several

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hundred documents that looked of interest, and, in my efforts to educate myself on the Command and Control minds of CINCPAC, ended up spending nights and weekends and days poring over these. They gave me essentially any document that I wanted to see and I saw them in a great variety of areas. In the course of several months I had what at that time might have been an unprecedented ability to read the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in particular the files of the Pacific.

In the course of doing this work, I learned from Dr. Ruth Davis, who was in charge of the computer studies for CINCPAC and all the computer development for CINCPAC, for the first time of a plan she said I should see, called the JSCP, pronounced "J-SCAP," on which the GEOP, CINCPAC General Emergency Operations Plan, was based. (JSCP = Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan). She told me that the Secretary

of Defense and the President - and I don't know how she knew this, but it turned out to be correct - did not know of the existence or the nature of the JSCP but that I definitely ought to see it to understand the character of the plans. I'm-almost sure that I did see it in the Pacific, because it was armed with that knowledge, that I was able, in Washington, to continue to study the current and past JSCPs' and to discuss such matters with the planners in Washington, when my contact, colonels in the Plans Division of the Air Staff, realized how much I already knew.

Now, it turned out to be a fact that the JSCP, both the contents and the existence of the JSCP, had been kept from all previous presidents and Secretaries of Defense, thus civilian authorities. This seems almost unbelievable unless you knew the background of relationships between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs. There was no Secretary of Defense until 1948-49, that was the time that the Department of Defense was created, and the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense gradually evolved over the next decade. Before 1958 the Secretary of Defense and his Assistant Secretaries were seen essentially as functioning in certain non-operational areas, such as procurement, research and development, personnel, budget, and so forth, but not having either responsibilities or command powers in direct area of combat operations or plans. Thus, although a Secretary of Defense like Charles

Wilson, might be in on high level crisis decisions, as in the Quemoy Crisis of 1954 and 1958, he also might not be; in fact the record shows that he was sometimes present and sometimes wasn't, and it would depend on the personality and his relationship with the President. So, during this whole period, then, the Joint Chiefs had a basis for saying that the Secretary of Defense had no "need to know" operational war plans, since he was not involved in the operational command problem. But in 1958, the Reorganization Act of '58 put the Secretary of Defense directly in the chain-of-command, second to the President in the chain-of-command from the President to the unified and subordinate commanders.

It was President Eisenhower's desire to abolish the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had no respect for them, having dealt with them as a theater commander himself, the supreme commander in Europe, but in particular he was disillusioned with their post-war performance. He wanted to abolish them, but they were preserved mainly by Congress, who wrote into the Acts that the Joint Chiefs should be the principle military advisors to the President. The Act did not put them in the chain-of-command, which went from the President to the Secretary of Defense and to the unified commanders, such as SACEUR and CINCPAC. The Secretary of Defense, however, who took office at that time was Neil McElroy, from Proctor and Gamble, who had no background in military

matters and who, though supposed to be a very intelligent man, put in an unusually short day because he had a sick wife. He was easy to manipulate by the Military. The

Joint Chiefs came to McElroy and urged him to write a DOD directive which reinterpreted this Act, as follows:

"The chain-of-command is from the President as Commander-In-Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Unified Subordinate Commanders, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff," *(italics)* implying that the Joint Chiefs would be, in some sense, a channel for his directives. They further got him to agree, as a practical matter, to allocate all operational responsibilities to them. In effect, the Act was circumvented; although it was on the books, it resulted in no real change of operating responsibilities in 1958 or 1959.

Secretary Gates, who succeeded McElroy under Eisenhower, had much stronger instincts to exercise control himself, but because all past practices kept him from knowing what it was that he needed to know and did not know, and where the levers of power really were in the Pentagon, he had almost no ability to do this. One aspect of this secrecy was that the JCS had formally adopted, in writing, a set of practices designed to keep the Secretary of Defense from ever asking any questions directly about their general war plans. The first protective device was to call the war plan the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, which did not betray to a layman that it had to do with nuclear war targeting, for the current year, in Russia, and other aspects of general war

planning. It was usually referred to by its initials JSCP, but there was a directive in writing by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the words "Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or the capital letters JSCP," were never to be allowed to appear in correspondence between the JCS and any agency of the office of the Secretary of Defense. If there was an absolute need to refer to such plans in some oblique fashion, reference was to be made to "capabilities planning" (lower case) which would, again, not suggest the existence of a specific plan or suggest that it was a war plan. Any JCS staff papers that used these initials or words, had to be retyped to eliminate all such references if they were to be referred to the Secretary of Defense.

The effect of this was that almost certainly no civilian, including the Secretary of Defense, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense was aware that there was a piece of paper of the character of the JSCP. What they did see, as, in effect, another attention-distracting device, was a plan called JSOP, or Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, which was a plan for budgetary procurement and R & D purposes which covered a five-year period starting four years in the future, so it covered the period from four to nine years off. It talked again of objectives, tasks, concepts, and area responsibilities as a basis for planning. This actually followed the current JSCP language, usually word for word - rather ironically, implying that objectives and tasks that far in the future could be regarded as identical with those

for the next twelve months - so the reader of the JSOP would have, without knowing it, a pretty close idea of the nature of our current war plan.

But that held only with certain, quite significant exceptions. For one thing, an annex to the JSCP (with no counterpart in the JSOP) was the SAC War Plan, the SIOP (Single Integrated Operations Plan) which laid out, in detail, the nature of our nuclear war operations. Throughout the Eisenhower period, and mainly for budgetary reasons, a strategy had been adopted that treated nuclear weapons as essentially "conventional", to be used wherever they were militarily efficient. Thus, not only was the general war plan entirely nuclear, but what they call limited war planning also relied heavily upon nuclear weapons, mainly shorter-range nuclear weapons such as the artillery and short-range weapons possessed by the Army and cruise missiles possessed by the Navy. A third category they called "cold war operations" which included subversive covert operations.

Now, a key question was the dividing line between the type of wars. In particular: When were the general war plans to be called into action? The JSOP provided no definition of general war that would give a hint as to when the general war plan was to apply. Such a definition did appear in the JSCP; in fact, this was perhaps the most "sensative" piece of information in the JSCP, and the main reason for protecting the JSCP from the eyes of civilian authority.

The key to the definition in the JSCP was the fact that in the course of the inter-service rivalries that existed in the period when the military budget was, from their point of view, severely restricted by Eisenhower's concern with the possibility of national bankruptcy, the tactics of the budget battle between the Services had come to focus on the war plan and specifically on the definition of general war. The key budgetary question was regarded as being: How many divisions was the Army to be allowed to ask for in support of its mission? This, of course, depended on how its mission was specified. As the Air Force saw it, and with some basis, there was an almost unlimited amount of money that could be spent on Army divisions if they were to be allowed to match the number of Russian divisions. (This was especially true since, for somewhat different reasons, both American and NATO intelligence produced, for years, enormously inflated estimates of Soviet ground strength: for example, often ignoring the fact that the Russian division was less than half the size of an American division, so that a simple comparison of numbers of divisions gave very misleading notions of the balance of actual numerical forces, aside from differences in types of communications, tanks, fire-power, and many other aspects.)

Mexwell Taylor was the only one to reveal publicly the nature of this controversy and the budgetary focus on the planning, which he did with The Uncertain Trumpet,

his book which came out in the late 50's after his retirement as Chief of Staff of the Army. He described the JSOP, but even in that book he did not mention the JSCP. I don't remember when, if ever, that name came out in public. He did describe the controversy and pointed out that the battle had been fought and finally won by the Air Force on the issue of the definition of general war. He did not, however, mention that the definition did not appear in the JSOP (which was available to the Secretary of Defense and his civilian staff), and that it was stated only in current war plans stemming from the JSCP (plans which were not accessible to civilian authorities or staffs).

From a practical point of view, of course, the occurrence of general war was defined by the implementation of the JSCP general war plan. The question of when that would be implemented came to be determined by the definition. The definition, which appears only in the JSCP and in the subordinate documents like the war plans in the Pacific, was: "General War is defined as armed conflict with the Soviet Union." That raises another practical problem: how armed conflict was to be defined or determined. Since there were occasional skirmishes in East Europe involving patrols and around Berlin, it was generally accepted that a platoon skirmish with Russian forces was not to be regarded as "armed conflict," for the purposes of JSCP. The controversy between SACEUR — Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, the Nato Commander (always

an American) and lower levels of the US Army in Europe came to be defined as to whether one regiment or two regiments were to be dividing lines for conflict with the Soviet Union. Needless to say, all gaming or planning involving Berlin Corridor Crises talked of confrontations starting with regiments but quickly going to the level of two to three divisions. It was essentially assumed by all that one to two divisions would, beyond doubt, meet the definition of the conditions for general war.

In practice, when they came close to actual confrontation in the Berlin Crisis - which, remember, was not really until 1961 - people did not imagine going to general war as soon as one or two divisions might be involved. But prior to 1961, no plans existed for war beyond the level of one and two divisions with the Soviet Union except the general war plans, based on the JSCP and the SIOP. Moreover no one was allowed to create any alternative plan, because of the intimacy of the relationship between the planning process and the budgetary process, which was the heart of military concern throughout this period. To have made a plan envisioning limited, non-nuclear operations against Soviet units involving more than a few divisions, would have been to admit that the Army had a potential role or responsibility for such a conflict; that would have given them a charter to go to their allies in Congress, with the "requirements" for such capability, which meant not only the

JSCP and the President

Although all of these disputes and their motivation were well known at the level of the Air Staff War Planners I was dealing with, there was essentially no public discussion of them at all. The one exception was a brief account in Maxwell Taylor's book The Uncertain Trumpet which he published in 1960 after his retirement as Chief of Staff of the Army. Since I cannot expect it to be easily credible that issues of such import could have taken the precise form I have described - let alone for the considerations I have mentioned - I will quote the corresponding passage of Taylor's account:

The concern over the snowballing of defense costs led to the next major conflict revolving around the military strategy. This clash occurred in the spring of 1956 in connection with the drafting by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan" (JSOP 60) for Fiscal Year 1960. This is the midrange planning document which undertakes to estimate force requirements four years in advance. In the short time since the Ramey meeting, Admiral Radford had become convinced that it would be financially impossible to continue the military programs as planned and that the economies should be made at the expense of the conventional (nonatomic) forces. In particular, he was determined to eliminate from military planning any consideration of the possibility of a conventional war with the Soviet Union. The issue took the form of an argument over the definition of general war and the extent to which the armed forces should count on the use of atomic weapons. I proposed language which would recognize the possibility of some limitations on the use of atomic weapons, particularly in the initial stages of a conflict with the USSR, and the consequent need for conventional forces of significant size. Admiral Radford and the other Chiefs opposed this change, which, if accepted, would have justified greater expenditures for nonatomic forces. In the end, my view was overruled and the definition of general war established as a conflict in which the U.S. and USSR would be directly involved and in which atomic weapons would be used at the outset. The same decision authorized the armed forces to count on the use of atomic weapons not only from the outset of general war but also in situations short of general war when required by military considerations. In effect, these actions ruled out consideration of a conventional conflict of any sort with the USSR and weakened the case for conventionally armed forces in limited wars.

It should be noted that in Taylor's account of this dispute he describes the definition of general war as being determined in connection with the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP-60). If that is correct, it would imply that the definition of general war actually appeared in the JSOP in 1956, whereas it did not in later editions of this document (which was annually available to the civilian part of the Department of Defense). Actually, however, it is more likely that Taylor's account simply reflects his own continuation of the JCS' "cover and deception plan" concealing the very existence of a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), since nowhere in this book does he refer to the JSCP. It may have been unprecedented, in 1960, for Taylor even to mention the JSOP in public print, but in the three places where he does (pages 22, 38 and 85-87), he describes the structure of planning in such a way that it would be appropriate to mention the JSCP as well yet he refrains from doing so, nor does he mention the JSCP at any other point in the book.

The significance of this point is twofold: a) It underlines the "sensitivity" of the JSCP, about which Taylor remained reticent in 1960 even while being unprecedently forthcoming about so much else; b) his reticence conceals from the reader the fact that as of 1959-1960 and later - and almost surely, in the 1956 period of which Taylor was writing - the nature of this dispute, its resolution in connection with the definition of general war, and the very document in which this resolution occurred, were all being deliberately kept from any civilian authority even within the Department of Defense.

Thus, without the knowledge of civilian officials in the Department of Defense or the Commander in Chief in the White House, let alone Congress, the budgetary struggle among the services had led as early as 1956 to a highly restrictive definition of general war in the basic war plan which underlay annual war planning at all levels of command, such that the dividing line between "limited war" and all-out general nuclear war was drawn between the absence or presence of a significant number of Soviet troops in conflict with American or allied troops.

As a footnote to later events, I can't resist mentioning two incidents in Taylor's narrative following this passage. Taylor mentions, "One characteristic of this period was the effort of the Department of Defense and the State Department to keep secret the struggle which was going on within the Joint Chiefs of Staff over Massive Retaliation and related issues." (Page 43) The Army staff had written a paper entitled "The National Military Program." Although it was "an unclassified document," Taylor was blocked from writing an article presenting these views in Foreign Affairs. For varying reasons both the State Department and the Defense Department refused to clear the article for public release: Taylor finally, four years later, presents it as an appendix to his book: "It is of interest now primarily as an indication of the efforts at the time to conceal the existence of the deep schism in the JCS and the growing doubts about Massive Retaliation." Meanwhile, after the decision described above on the definition of general war, "with this victory to support his position, Admiral Radford in July 1956, led a major effort to cut the conventional forces and in particular the Army. He introduced into the JCS the most drastic proposal of the New Look, which if adopted would have caused a complete revision of our force structure in the next four years." (Page 39)

The Radford proposal would have cut Army deployments in Europe and Asia down to small atomic task forces, with the Army in the United States to be greatly reduced; fighting limited wars would be the task of Air and Naval forces with the Marines doing the ground fighting. Taylor opposed this policy in a session of the JCS on July 9, 1956, as "an unacceptable military program for the United States," but he got no support from the other Chiefs and he left the meeting "feeling sure that the usual four-to-one split was about to be carried to the Secretary of Defense, where my case would be lost."

"That might well have resulted but for help from an unexpected quarter. On July 13, 1956, the New York Times carried an article by the late Anthony Leviero, its Washington correspondent, with the headline, "Radford Seeking 800,000 Man Cut." The article went on to describe with reasonable accuracy parts of the proposal which had just been considered in closed session by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. It appeared that Leviero had either benefited from a deliberate leak of information or succeeded in putting together bits and pieces of facts gleaned from contacts with individuals who knew something about what was up. In any case, he had done a very shrewd job of guessing the nature of some of the events taking place in the highest military circles.

This so-called Radford leak created a tremendous hullabaloo in the Department of Defense, in Washington generally, and also had its repercussions abroad. An immediate investigation was started to try to determine the source. The investigation brought nothing to light to permit the identification or punishment of offenders, if such there were. Abroad, the leak was most disturbing to some of our allies. Chancellor Adenauer in particular was very much concerned about the reported proposal to reduce Army forces in Europe. He dispatched at once General Adolf Heusinger, Chief of the German Armed Forces, to discuss the matter with key Defense Department officials. In the meetings following his arrival in Washington, General Heusinger made a very eloquent argument for the indispensable nature of a strong ground shield in Europe as a part of the over-all strategic deterrent. Secretary Wilson assured him that no significant reduction in our European deployments was intended, so that he was able to return to Germany with a reassuring report for the Chancellor.

As a result of this publicity, Admiral Padford's proposal was withdrawn from the JCS and all copies of it in written form were recalled to the office of origin. The Critical danger to our overseas deployments and limited-war forces was laid for the moment. It was to reappear, however, a year later in slightly attenuated form in the Wilson-Radford program for the military forces in the period 1957 to 1961.

(After the publicity given to the nature of the leak process in the last few years, it may be left as an exercise to the reader to guess from what office, and by whose authority, the dastardly "deliberate leak" had issued).

Memo for the Record
(dictated by Daniel Ellsberg, July 1971)

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the " Sino-Soviet bloc " and military secrets from the Secretary of Defense and the President.

The JSCP, the SecDef & the Pres

Rand Corporation

I had just joined Rand permanently in July of 1959, having spent the summer of '58 there as a consultant. In the summer of '59 I chose as a focus of my research the command-control process for nuclear forces. This was a question which was coming to seem of increasing importance as people studied the process of the alerting of nuclear forces in the event of an oncoming nuclear attack and the implementation of an execute order by the President.

In the fall of 1959 CINCPAC (the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific), who was at that time Adm. Harry Felt, called for a study of the command and control process of nuclear forces in the Pacific to be done in Hawaii, under his command. The Office of Naval Research organized the study under Dr. John Wilkes who threw together researchers from a number of non-profit research corporations working for the Defense Department and I was asked to join this from the

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Also, at each level of authority there are a number of people who are aware of the plan at the next higher level which governs that plans of the subordinate commander. So even in a given theater one runs into hundreds of people who have a pretty good knowledge of the structure of plans relating to that theater. This includes a handful of civilians, mainly operations analysts, left over from World War II, who work at improving the operational details and work directly with the military. In effect, they are employees of the military. But aside from them, very

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hundred documents that looked of interest, and, in my efforts to educate myself on the Command and Control minds of CINCPAC, ended up spending nights and weekends and days poring over these. They gave me essentially any document that I wanted to see and I saw them in a great variety of areas. In the course of several months I had what at that time might have been an unprecedented ability to read the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in particular the files of the Pacific.

Ultimately, in order to understand the theory of the plan, the strategy and the way it was likely to be implemented, I read the entire structure of plans relating to nuclear war for the Pacific. This meant, to give you an idea of this, starting with the GEOP (General Emergency Operations Plan) which was up-dated yearly and was the CINCPAC Plan. Below this were the component plans of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the USAPPAC, CINCPAC Fleet and PACAF. Below them, for example, in the Air Force case, a Seventh Air Force Plan, ^{then} this going down to Air Division, then finally plans relating to an individual squadron. In the Navy case we go down to the CINCPACFleet, down to the 7th Fleet and ultimately to carrier division and individual carriers and pilots. In the Army there were also what were called subordinate unified commands, in which a particular commander would command the ^{land} fleet services in a particular area. There was the Taiwan Defense Command

*The "line" -
Secret 6/6*

and the Korean Command which also had the U.N. Command, called CINCUNC or COMUSK (Commander of U.S. Forces, Korea). and in the Army case you would be going down ultimately to the plan for divisions and battalions. So I would have read in many cases, following a particular service line down, seven or eight levels of plans with increasing specificity and decreasing geographical coverage in terms of targets and units involved.

All of these would use overlapping language. They would start with a statement of objectives and of the concept of the plan, strategy, and the task involved. The language of course would pretty much be unified; it was intended to be uniform from top to bottom. But both because of secrecy and by bureaucratic division of labor, there was no process of review of these plans that involved looking at the entire structure of plans; or in fact, looking at anything but the next lower level of plans, which was based on one's own unit's plan and, of course, the next higher level of plan on which the planner based his own plan. So typically a person would be aware of three levels of the plan, but not more.

I discovered by questioning people experienced in the process - and many of these planners had worked in Washington in the JCS - that there was no agency throughout that did a review of more than these two or three levels, or at the most, four levels. The effect.

of this, I discovered, were astounding discrepancies if one compared levels even three or four levels apart.

Changes that would appear subtle from one plan to the next, from one level to the next, in the wording of objectives or in the assignment of tasks would be magnified as they went down several levels. So if you compared, let's say, four levels apart, the task that a carrier division or even the Seventh Fleet might find itself assigned by its planners and commander to carry out would be markedly different from the task envisioned for that area and situation at the level of CINCPAC or the JCS.

There was no reason to believe that the higher level commanders were aware of these discrepancies. As a matter of fact, people at the lower level were not aware in many cases that there were these enormous discrepancies, because no one ever had access in general. Except for that one cage in the Pacific there was probably no other place in the Pacific that collected all of these plans in one place and had the for higher level plans with which to compare one's own plans. You could only compare with your next higher level, which of course you were always interpreting to meet your own circumstances to some degree.

One aspect of this, a gross aspect, was that Pacific Forces from top to bottom were focused on a conflict with China, since with the range limitations of their weapons

and the geography of the Sino-Soviet Bloc almost no Russian target lay within their range except for a few in the Vladivostok and Siberian area. Once you destroyed Vladivostok, war with Russia was no longer "interesting" to the CINCPAC Forces, whereas China, although offering few really "lucrative" industrial targets, loomed as a large land mass suitable for attack and largely within reach, with the additional feature that the population was heavily concentrated in the seaboard area close to the Seventh Fleet carriers. In contrast to China, CINCPAC planners were unable to get really interested in the question of fighting Russia, although of course this was the almost exclusive preoccupation in the late '50's of Washington, and in the European area.

When I later became aware of the provisions ^{in the} JCS Joint Strategic Capability Plan which governed all of the theater plans, I found that, in principle, provision was made for conflicts that involved only Russia. But I had by then discovered that no such provision was made either in plan or in practice in any area of Pacific operations. This omission was reflected in writing, it was reflected in the way training was conducted and weapons were allocated, but also in the attitude of all of the commanders and officers involved. When the very question was raised of the possibility of fighting Russia "rather than" China, they would express only bafflement, horror, almost physical

nausea at the thought; and they would express this in such terms as: "I just cannot conceive of their doing such an unbelievably stupid thing as to take on the Russians and not also the Chinese."

Very simply, there were neither plans nor capability in the short run, I discovered, to attack only Russian targets and not Chinese targets. By that I mean that on a runway in Guam or Okinawa or Korea, planes would be targeted in a fashion on the alert runway - ready to take off on ten minutes alert - such that one plane with a 1.1 megaton bomb slung under it would be targeted for the Vladivostok area and a plane next to it on the runway, which would be taking off at a few seconds interval, would be targeted and trained and briefed and practiced for a target in China. In other words, planes within a ten-man alert section on a given runway would be scrambled in terms of their national targets. And because this targeting was handled by the crew on computer readouts which did not identify whether the target would hit China or Russia, but merely gave coordinates, there was no way, either manually or in simple terms of computer programs, to unscramble the targets and assure that, say, only planes 7, 6 and 11, which were targeted for Russia, should take off out of that alert force.

It had never occurred to anyone that I ever met in the Pacific that such an order might come down, and not only had no provision ever been made for it, but the provisions made

for general nuclear war were such that there was no physical way in which to bring about an attack only on Russian targets or only on Chinese targets.

Omitting Russia was, in a way a little easier because so many targets were listed for China that some entire airfields would be targeted only on China or couldn't reach Russia. The fields in the South Pacific had no Russian targets because they couldn't reach Russia. As I discussed this with planners I discovered, in practical terms, that if you seriously wanted only to attack China, for example, you could simply cut out an entire airfield in some cases and thus, you would lose some Chinese targets but you would cut out all the Russian targets that were out of range of other fields. But if you wanted to hit only Russia there was almost no airfield that was targeted only on Russian targets. You could cut out the CINCPAC forces entirely. Of course, you would do that only if it occurred to you that this might be a problem. I never found anyone in Washington who had any idea that there was this kind of problem. To show the kind of physical ways this showed up, in many targeting maps in operations and plan centers and command posts in the Pacific - I am talking about airfields and command posts in Okinawa, Formosa, Guam, Tokyo, and I was on board several carriers and command ships in the Pacific - in each one of these places you would have a map showing nuclear war targets. It would be their most secret map, usually

covered by a screen or a curtain drawn over it when other people were being briefed in the room who did not have access to these nuclear targets. On those maps, typically, the map did not show the boundary between China and Russia. So you could not tell simply by inspecting the arrows on the map, the pins on the map that indicated targets of different category, whether they were in China or Russia. In some maps, for example, I would find a piece of colored string put on for convenience, for aesthetic reasons perhaps, indicating roughly the boundary of Russia and China. But that meant that a high level planner in that division could not, just by inspecting those targets, decide which ones to pull.

The next question would be, could he determine from the target quickly what tail number - which was the way they designated airplanes - was assigned to that particular target? The answer was that it was an extremely laborious process. It was not something you do in minutes or hours. It would probably be a matter of days or weeks to sort out what planes were assigned to what target; and that meant that if this was anything like an emergency or surprise attack situation, where we were being attacked, it was simply physically impossible to do that kind of work.

But that was only one part of it. The other part was the question--Given the attitude and preconceptions in the minds of operators and alert officers, how were

they likely to interpret various orders that came down? Let me give you one aspect of this. For reasons that I will go into later, "general war" was defined in the Joint Chiefs capabilities plan as war with Russia. General war alerting orders thus tended to have simply the character: "execute general war plans." If general war should be decided on as a result of a conflict with Russia, quite possibly arising out of the Berlin Corridor as in '61, it would have led to general war execute orders which were prewritten and prepositioned. For both speed and security the text of these orders, omitting date and time of execution, would be prepositioned with the lowest levels of command all over the world. Thus the actual execute order could be sent in the clear, without being coded, for greater speed and reliability, and would simply take the form: "Execute Order No. XYZ," giving a date and time of execution. The person receiving that would look up the plan referred to in a "library" - actually, usually, a looseleaf folder of prepositioned messages - and would fill in the date and time. Moreover, the execute orders themselves, in the Pentagon, were prewritten, except for some last minute details so that an officer in the Joint Staff would fill in certain blanks, literally blanks in the message, before he sent that out.

Thus you could predict very closely how a given decision at the top would be reflected in the wording of

messages that would go down to subordinate layers of command, because in each layer these messages, for speed and reliability and for ability to transmit in the clear, were prepositioned. As soon as the few blanks were filled in, you knew the exact wording of the whole message. You could make, then, not guesses but judgments near certainty as to how those messages would be acted on, if you knew the preconceptions or the understanding of these officers below and the plans and preparations they had made for carrying them out.

There was no blank in the execute orders going out from Washington, at that time, specifying countries to be hit under conditions of general war. Yet as I have said, the general war planners - and I spoke to the very highest levels of planners in Washington - had no awareness of the general war plans distributed throughout the Pacific which said, in effect, "In the event of general war, you will expend most of your weapons on China plus whatever can reach Russian target on the few Russian targets within range." This was reiterated at every level. Even if there had been understanding of the intent in one level of the order from Washington - to hit Russia, say, but not China - and some attempt to correct for this, one could show that it would almost surely be aborted by the execute orders and responses at lower levels. Moreover, if it was decided

not to hit China one would have a choice either of hitting nothing at all or hitting both Russia and China nevertheless. And in general war discrimination is not to be expected; aside from the fact that it was the attitude of all of these officers, without exception, that an order by their superior to hit only Russia amounted to insanity. They were literally shocked by the suggestion.

The upshot of all this was that one could make an extremely strong case that the result of an order by the President or the Joint Chiefs of Staff to hit only military targets in Russia - and the people in Washington were able to conceive of such a situation, there was even some provision for it - with near certainty a result of that order would be the destruction of all cities in China. And this without anyone in the level of command believing that he was doing anything against his orders, or certainly, against the interests of the United States. This would involve, in Russia and China together, the deaths of 370,000,000 people.

2

In the course of doing this work, I learned from Dr. Ruth Davis, who was in charge of the computer studies for CINCPAC and all the computer development for CINCPAC, for the first time of a plan she said I should see, called the JSCP, pronounced "J-SCAP," on which the GEOP, CINCPAC General Emergency Operations Plan, was based. (JSCP = Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan). She told me that the Secretary

of Defense and the President - and I don't know how she knew this, but it turned out to be correct - did not know of the existence or the nature of the JSCP but that I definitely ought to see it to understand the character of the plans. ~~I'm almost sure that I did see it in the~~ Pacific, because it was armed with ^{that} knowledge, that I was able, in Washington, to continue to study the current and past JSCPs' and to discuss such matters with the planners in Washington, when my contact^s, colonels in the Plans Division of the Air Staff, realized how much I already knew.

Now, it turned out to be a fact that the JSCP, both the contents and the existence of the JSCP, had been kept from all previous presidents and Secretaries of Defense, ~~thus~~ civilian authorities. This seems almost unbelievable unless you knew the background of relationships between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs. There was no Secretary of Defense until 1948-49, that was the time that the Department of Defense was created, and the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense gradually evolved over the next decade. Before 1958 the Secretary of Defense and his Assistant Secretaries were seen essentially as functioning in certain non-operational areas, such as procurement, research and development, personnel, budget, and so forth, but not having either responsibilities or command powers in direct area of combat operations or plans. Thus, although a Secretary of Defense like Charles

Wilson, might be in on high level crisis decisions, as in the Quemoy Crisis of 1954 and 1958, he also might not be; in fact the record shows that he was sometimes present and sometimes wasn't, and it would depend on the personality and his relationship with the President. So, during this whole period, then, the Joint Chiefs had a basis for saying that the Secretary of Defense had no "need to know" operational war plans, since he was not involved in the operational command problem. But in 1958, the Reorganization Act of '58 put the Secretary of Defense directly in the chain-of-command, second to the President in the chain-of-command from the President to the unified and subordinate commanders.

It was President Eisenhower's desire to abolish the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had no respect for them, having dealt with them as a theater commander himself, the supreme commander in Europe, but in particular he was disillusioned with their post-war performance. He wanted to abolish them, but they were preserved mainly by Congress, who wrote into the Acts that the Joint Chiefs should be the principle military advisors to the President. The Act did not put them in the chain-of-command, which went from the President to the Secretary of Defense and to the unified commanders, such as SACEUR and CINCPAC. The Secretary of Defense, however, who took office at that time was Neil McElroy, from Proctor and Gamble, who had no background in military

matters and who, though supposed to be a very intelligent man, put in an unusually short day because he had a sick wife. He was easy to manipulate by the Military. The Joint Chiefs came to McElroy and urged him to write a DOD directive which reinterpreted this Act, as follows: "The chain-of-command is from the President as Commander-In-Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Unified Subordinate Commanders, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff," implying that the Joint Chiefs would be, in some sense, a channel for his directives. They further got him to agree, as a practical matter, to allocate all operational responsibilities to them. In effect, the Act was circumvented; although it was on the books, it resulted in no real change of operating responsibilities in 1958 or 1959.

Secretary Gates, who succeeded McElroy under Eisenhower, had much stronger instincts to exercise control himself, but because all past practices kept him from knowing what it was that he needed to know and did not know, and where the levers of power really were in the Pentagon, he had almost no ability to do this. One aspect of this secrecy was that the JCS had formally adopted, in writing, a set of practices designed to keep the Secretary of Defense from ever asking any questions directly about their general war plans. The first protective device was to call the war plan the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, which did not betray to a layman that it had to do with nuclear war targeting, for the current year, in Russia, and other aspects of general war

planning. It was usually referred to by its initials JSCP, but there was a directive in writing by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the words "Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or the capital letters JSCP," were never to be allowed to appear in correspondence between the JCS and any agency of the office of the Secretary of Defense. If there was an absolute need to refer to such plans in some oblique fashion, reference was to be made to "capabilities planning" (lower case) which would, again, not suggest the existence of a specific plan or suggest that it was a war plan. Any JCS staff papers that used these initials or words, had to be retyped to eliminate all such references if they were to be referred to the Secretary of Defense.

The effect of this was that almost certainly no civilian, including the Secretary of Defense, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense was aware that there was a piece of paper of the character of the JSCP. What they did see, as, in effect, another attention-distracting device, was a plan called JSOP, or Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, which was a plan for budgetary procurement and R & D purposes which covered a five-year period starting four years in the future, so it covered the period from four to nine years off. It talked again of objectives, tasks, concepts, and area responsibilities as a basis for planning. This actually followed the current JSCP language, usually word for word - rather ironically, implying that objectives and tasks that far in the future could be regarded as identical with those

for the next twelve months - so the reader of the JSOP would have, without knowing it, a pretty close idea of the nature of our current war plan.

But that held only with certain, quite significant exceptions. For one thing, an annex to the JSCP (with no counterpart in the JSOP) was the SAC War Plan, the SIOP (Single Integrated Operations Plan) which laid out, in detail, the nature of our nuclear war operations. Throughout the Eisenhower period, and mainly for budgetary reasons, a strategy had been adopted that treated nuclear weapons as essentially "conventional", to be used wherever they were militarily efficient. Thus, not only was the general war plan entirely nuclear, but what they call limited war planning also relied heavily upon nuclear weapons, mainly shorter-range nuclear weapons such as the artillery and short-range weapons possessed by the Army and cruise missiles possessed by the Navy. A third category they called "cold war operations" which included subversive covert operations.

Now, a key question was the dividing line between the type of wars. In particular: When were the general war plans to be called into action? The JSOP provided no definition of general war that would give a hint as to when the general war plan was to apply. Such a definition did appear in the JSCP; in fact, this was perhaps the most "sensitive" piece of information in the JSCP, and the main reason for protecting the JSCP from the eyes of civilian authority.

The key to the definition in the JSCP was the fact that in the course of the inter-service rivalries that existed in the period when the military budget was, from their point of view, severely restricted by Eisenhower's concern with the possibility of national bankruptcy, the tactics of the budget battle between the Services had come to focus on the war plan and specifically on the definition of general war. The key budgetary question was regarded as being: How many divisions was the Army to be allowed to ask for in support of its mission? This, of course, depended on how its mission was specified. As the Air Force saw it, and with some basis, there was an almost unlimited amount of money that could be spent on Army divisions if they were to be allowed to match the number of Russian divisions. (This was especially true since, for somewhat different reasons, both American and NATO intelligence produced, for years, enormously inflated estimates of Soviet ground strength: for example, often ignoring the fact that the Russian division was less than half the size of an American division, so that a simple comparison of numbers of divisions gave very misleading notions of the balance of actual numerical forces, aside from differences in types of communications, tanks, fire-power, and many other aspects.)

Mexwell Taylor was the only one to reveal publicly the nature of this controversy and the budgetary focus on the planning, which he did with The Uncertain Trumpet,

his book which came out in the late 50's after his retirement as Chief of Staff of the Army. He described the JSOP, but even in that book he did not mention the JSCP. I don't remember when, if ever, that name came out in public. He did describe the controversy and pointed out that the battle had been fought and finally won by the Air Force on the issue of the definition of general war. He did not, however, mention that the definition did not appear in the JSOP (which was available to the Secretary of Defense and his civilian staff), and that it was stated only in current war plans stemming from the JSCP (plans which were not accessible to civilian authorities or staffs).

From a practical point of view, of course, the occurrence of general war was defined by the implementation of the JSCP general war plan. The question of when that would be implemented came to be determined by the definition. The definition, which appears only in the JSCP and in the subordinate documents like the war plans in the Pacific, was: General War is defined as armed conflict with the Soviet Union. That raises another practical problem: how armed conflict was to be defined or determined. Since there were occasional skirmishes in East Europe involving patrols and around Berlin, it was generally accepted that a platoon skirmish with Russian forces was not to be regarded as "armed conflict," for the purposes of JSCP. The controversy between SACEUR -- Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, the Nato Commander (always

an American) and lower levels of the US Army in Europe came to be defined as to whether one regiment or two regiments were to be dividing lines for conflict with the Soviet Union. Needless to say, all gaming or planning involving Berlin Corridor Crises talked of confrontations starting with regiments but quickly going to the level of two to three divisions. It was essentially assumed by all that one to two divisions would, beyond doubt, meet the definition of the conditions for general war.

In practice, when they came close to actual confrontation in the Berlin Crisis - which, remember, was not really until 1961 - people did not imagine going to general war as soon as one or two divisions might be involved. But prior to 1961, no plans existed for war beyond the level of one and two divisions with the Soviet Union except the general war plans, based on the JSCP and the SIOP. Moreover no one was allowed to create any alternative plan, because of the intimacy of the relationship between the planning process and the budgetary process, which was the heart of military concern throughout this period. To have made a plan envisioning limited, non-nuclear operations against Soviet units involving more than a few divisions, would have been to admit that the Army had a potential role or responsibility for such a conflict; that would have given them a charter to go to their allies in Congress, with the "requirements" for such capability, which meant not only the

divisions, but artillery and close air support. Such large budgetary requests, if granted, would be taken out of the hide of the Air Force and Navy, which were predominant during this period. There was great resistance to any plans being made for anything but this one general war plan stemming from this basic resolution of the definition of general war.

None of this might have had a determining influence on the thinking of the highest level planners in Washington who understood what this was all about. But at all the lower levels no hint was given to anyone that this was all a game being played for the purpose of the budget; on the contrary, all of their preparations, training, alerting procedures, were based upon the plan as it was received from the Joint Staff. So that definition was, in effect, taken more and more literally if one went down closer and closer to the actual level of combat operations.

Meanwhile, the Sac War Plan had evolved by the year 1960 into the plan called the SIOP or Single Integrated Operational Plan, which for purposes of efficiency and coordination had gathered all the nuclear war plans, and general war plans of the various commands, into one coordinated target list so as to more efficiently allocate weapons to targets all over the world. The desire for efficiency in allocation was a major motive for this plan, but the plan itself was so complex in the coordination that it involved that it had only one, real strategy embodied in it. The price of bringing every theater and

component service plan into harmony with every other into one plan was the total elimination of any flexibility in carrying out the plan. So much planning was involved in producing this one that there was simply no staff time available to produce a second alternative.

The focus was so much on harmonization and coordination that the planners themselves were appalled at the confusion and the chaos that might result if there was an alternative presented, with the possibility that people might carry out different plans. There was thus, an exact parallel in every detail to the mobilizing plans that gave total rigidity to the mobilization of the Russians in Germany in World War I, which made it impossible, for example, for the Czar to mobilize against Austria without mobilizing against Germany, even though they recognized that mobilizing against Germany, with whom they wished not to be at war, would certainly cause Germany to execute its mobilization plan. Meanwhile the mobilization plans of Germany, which were based on precise railroad schedules, were so complex and rigid that they were not really able to think of mobilizing against any one opponent, France or Russia; they provided only for one strategy against both opponents.

... when circumstances in 1914 persuaded the Czar that
... execute mobilization plans against Austria he was quickly
... by his military advisors that it was necessary to implement
... mobilization plans against both Germany and Austria (even
... Austria had no desire to be at war with Germany, or even to
... Germany). And this Russian maneuver had the predictable
... of causing the Kaiser to implement Germany's single war
... called, first, for defeating the French, so as to be
... subsequently to shift troops east to the Russian front. Since,
... the attack on France moved through Belgium, this "technical"
... of the rigid plan had the diplomatic effect of calling
... alliance commitments into play in defense of Belgian
... .

... 1940, of the various "options" (actually reflecting only
... kinds of ready nuclear vehicles, depending on amount of
... that comprised what was really a single war strategy
... a single, fixed target system, none of these
... omitted, as targets: a) Russian cities; b) Russian command
... Eastern European nations; or d) (in the Pacific Command)

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JSCP and the President

Although all of these disputes and their motivation were well known at the level of the Air Staff War Planners I was dealing with, there was essentially no public discussion of them at all. The one exception was a brief account in Maxwell Taylor's book The Uncertain Trumpet which he published in 1960 after his retirement as Chief of Staff of the Army. Since I cannot expect it to be easily credible that issues of such import could have taken the precise form I have described - let alone for the considerations I have mentioned - I will quote the corresponding passage of Taylor's account:

The concern over the snowballing of defense costs led to the next major conflict revolving around the military strategy. This clash occurred in the spring of 1956 in connection with the drafting by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan" (JSCP 60) for Fiscal Year 1960. This is the midrange planning document which undertakes to estimate force requirements four years in advance. *P*In the short time since the Ramey meeting, Admiral Radford had become convinced that it would be financially impossible to continue the military programs as planned and that the economies should be made at the expense of the conventional (nonatomic) forces. In particular, he was determined to eliminate from military planning any consideration of the possibility of a conventional war with the Soviet Union.

*P*The issue took the form of an argument over the definition of general war and the extent to which the armed forces should count on the use of atomic weapons. I proposed language which would recognize the possibility of some limitations on the use of atomic weapons, particularly in the initial stages of a conflict with the USSR, and the consequent need for conventional forces of significant size. Admiral Radford and the other Chiefs opposed this change, which, if accepted, would have justified greater expenditures for nonatomic forces. In the end, my view was overruled and the definition of general war established as a conflict in which the U.S. and USSR would be directly involved and in which atomic weapons would be used at the outset. The same decision authorized the armed forces to count on the use of atomic weapons not only from the outset of general war but also in situations short of general war when required by military considerations. In effect, these actions ruled out consideration of a conventional conflict of any sort with the USSR and weakened the case for conventionally armed forces in limited wars.

It should be noted that in Taylor's account of this dispute he describes the definition of general war as being determined in connection with the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP-60). If that is correct, it would imply that the definition of general war actually appeared in the JSOP in 1956, whereas it did not in later editions of this document (which was annually available to the civilian part of the Department of Defense). Actually, however, it is more likely that Taylor's account simply reflects his own continuation of the JCS' "cover and deception plan" concealing the very existence of a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), since nowhere in this book does he refer to the JSCP. It may have been unprecedented, in 1960, for Taylor even to mention the JSOP in public print, but in the three places where he does (pages 22, 38 and 85-87), he describes the structure of planning in such a way that it would be appropriate to mention the JSCP as well yet he refrains from doing so, nor does he mention the JSCP at any other point in the book.

The significance of this point is twofold: a) It underlines the "sensitivity" of the JSCP, about which Taylor remained reticent in 1960 even while being unprecedently forthcoming about so much else; b) his reticence conceals from the reader the fact that as of 1959-1960 and later - and almost surely, in the 1956 period of which Taylor was writing - the nature of this dispute, its resolution in connection with the definition of general war, and the very document in which this resolution occurred, were all being deliberately kept from any civilian authority even within the Department of Defense.

Thus, without the knowledge of civilian officials in the Department of Defense or the Commander in Chief in the White House, let alone Congress, the budgetary struggle among the services had led as early as 1956 to a highly restrictive definition of general war in the basic war plan which underlay annual war planning at all levels of command, such that the dividing line between "limited war" and all-out general nuclear war was drawn between the absence or presence of a significant number of Soviet troops in conflict with American or allied troops.

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Moreover One major reason for the JCS to keep these disputes from the Secretary of Defense was a fear that he would decide then in a way that would influence the budget unfavorably to the Air Force, yet which could not be predicted or controlled by the other services either; so that there was a general agreement to keep the nature of the controversy and the way it was resolved from the attention of the Secretary of Defense. Even though Secretary of Defense Gates, increasingly insisted on having a say in operational matters, the practice was that he became aware only of such problems as the Chiefs unanimously agreed to submit to him; and such a subversion had to represent a definite determination on their part that all of them had better prospects of gaining by submitting it rather than by continuing to bargain it out among themselves. So very many important problems were never brought to his attention.

During this period Rand did not work for the Secretary of defense but for the Air Force, so in effect, only by going out of channels in a way that would directly threaten the budget and existence of Rand could Rand researchers and officers have made the Secretary of Defense aware of this situation.

~~But the same was true for officers within the Air Force.~~
Meanwhile, by contact with the air staff I furthered

my knowledge of the rationale behind the various plans and the high level plans. I had become aware that there were a number of high Air Force planning officers, colonels and generals, in particular a part of the plans division headed by Glen Kent, now a Lt. Gen., and another part ^{headed} by such people as Col. Russ Dougherty (now - 1975 - CINCSAC) — and there was a Col. Robert Lukeman (now a lieutenant general in the Air Staff; in charge of Policy Planning?) under Kent who were very concerned with the madness of some of the characteristics of the planning process and current plans. But inasmuch as it was determined by the high level superiors, on the basis of the budgetary conflict with the Secretary, they were really unable to influence it through ordinary command channels.

Meanwhile, I came increasingly to feel that it was essential that the President of the United States should be made aware of the nature of this general war planning system with all of its risks, both of rigidity and of increasing the likelihood of war, and the likelihood that if any sizeable

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war resulted , in particular with any Russian troops, the effect would be genocidal on an almost unimaginable scale throughout the world. In addition to this there were great risks of unauthorized action; all in addition to the physical vulnerability of the system, on which attention was increasingly focused. It seemed essential to me that the President himself have before his eyes the actual JSCP, for the first time, so that he could read it in context with the SAC War Plan, and make himself aware of the extreme simplicity, along with rigidity, stupidity, and bloody-mindedness, of these plans. The extreme nature of these qualities was almost impossible for anyone to imagine from a briefing, or on basis except actually examining the written plans; with their actual wording, and unite all that, in sum, they did not say, as well as what they did.)

The focus of my concern came increasingly to be, how to bring the nature of these plans to the attention of the President and the Secretary of Defense. I had, of course, no direct access to Secretary Gates. But in the Fall of 1960, during the campaign for the presidency, I did come into contact with two people who were widely supposed to be future officials in the Kennedy Administration. One was Paul Nitze, who took part in a conference at Monterey sponsored by Rand, on alternative military strategy. I spent a long drive to Big Sur, during a break in the conference, with Nitze, who had long had an interest in military matters and had been the drafter of the famous NSC-68 (just declassified in 1975,

by Freedom of Information Act suit) which had been the planning basis to our big rearmament program in 1950. He was now head of the Democratic Party Advisory Committee so he was the main Democratic figure on military political planning, and was expected to be a high official. I spent the time explaining to him the importance that the President personally come to read, take an interest in, and insist on monitoring and supervising the general war plans, though I did not describe them to him in detail. I simply said at great length what the urgency of this problem was, and that if he should become an official in the new Administration he should see to it that the President immediately inform himself on these matters.

I gave the same message to Walt Rostow, at a meeting of advisors on policy speeches during the Kennedy campaign that was convened by Archibald Cox. The meeting, at the Harvard Law School, was also attended by Ken Galbraith, and Chester Bowles, and the whole meeting was spent on Bowles' lecturing, but during that meeting - in the parking lot, during a long break - I spoke to Rostow, telling him what I had told Nitze. I further urged Rostow, that if he were ever close to the future President, he must ensure that the President ask to see the JSCP.

As a result of some help I had arranged that Rand researchers give to Kennedy in his speechwriting during the campaign, I was invited to the Inaugural Ball in Washington. On the Monday morning after the Inauguration, the new

officials for the first time sat in their offices. I went to see Paul Nitze that Monday morning, in his new office as Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, at which time I recalled to him our conversation of the fall before. I told him, "Now that you are in office, I can tell you the details of these plans." The Assistant Secretary for ISA is in charge of policy planning and would be the natural official to deal with any kind of planning, although they had never dealt with operational planning before.

As a result, Nitze did ask to see the JSCP; he asked it through Harry Rowen, who by this time had become his Deputy Assistant Secretary for Planning and Policy. Rowan passed the mission to me, as an ISA consultant. I saw a military officer in charge of plans under Rowan, who had been in that office for some time, an army general, and I made the mistake at that point of describing some of these problems to him. At the end I asked to see the JSCP for Nitze and he then refused. He said "You have no need to know," and he strongly refused to Rowan to allow any civilian access to that plan. He felt that he had access to it only informally, as an army officer, not in his capacity as an official within ISA. So Nitze's attempt to get at the plan was blocked.

Later Harry arranged for me to see McGeorge Bundy to brief him on this set of matters on command and control and the plans. I was ushered in by Robert Komer, who was

Bundy's assistant. I think it was February of 1961, the first month of the administration. I had never met Bundy, who had been at Harvard while I was there, but I had met Komer at Rand a couple of times earlier. I had an hour scheduled with Bundy. As I went in I worried that he was likely to be very skeptical or suspicious of the fact that I seemed to know so much about war plans as a civilian. In fact, he was not yet aware of how esoteric all this knowledge was or wasn't, but I didn't realize that, and I felt rather uncomfortably that I ought to begin by giving him some hints as to how I had gotten at this information. I began to talk of my participation in the CINCPAC Command and Control Project and my work with the Joint Staff. After two or three minutes of this he interrupted me very snootily with the cold question, "Is this a briefing or a confessional?" Whereupon I said to myself, "Alright, you asked for it," and proceeded quickly to outline the nature of these problems, emphasizing that I took for granted, on good basis, that he was ignorant of all these things and would not, in the normal course, ever have learned of them. I had the satisfaction, within a few minutes, of seeing his mouth drop open as he began to take furious notes, shaking his head and exclaiming under his breath. He lost his famous cool. But he took notes and asked penetrating questions very quickly for the whole hour. Afterwards Komer was very impressed and said to me that it was an extremely successful briefing; "I have

never seen him more concerned." I gave him a list of recommendations to deal with the problem, starting, of course, with the advice that he should begin by asserting his authority to read the JSCP, get hold of it, and then should read it, and familiarize himself and begin to work on it.

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Later, I was taken by Harry Rowan in with him to see Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, who had apparently been seized with this problem [a Pentagon expression]. Gilpatric told us that Bundy has asked him to "get the JSCP for the President," whereupon Gilpatric himself had called the joint staff and had been put through by his secretary to the colonel in charge of dissemination of nuclear war plans within the joint staff. He asked to see the JSCP. The colonel replied "Oh, we never release that."

Then Gilpatric said, "But the President wants to read it." The colonel replied, "But we have never released that." Gilpatric said, "You don't understand, I said the President wants to read it." This cut no ice. After a number of phone calls back and forth, finally a general on the Joint Staff offered a briefing to the President. To this Bundy, who by this time was advised of what had transpired, and was calling directly, said, "The President is a great reader; he wants to read the plan." Eventually, Gilpatric explained, they compromised; the Joint Staff would provide both a briefing and the plan. This was typical of their approach, in that

they wanted, by the briefing, to be on hand to make sure to interpret and explain any points that might come up, in their own terms.

As we stood discussing this in Gilpatric's office - by this time he had had the briefing on it, which McGeorge Bundy and I believe McNamara had also attended in his office in the Pentagon - I asked, "Did they give you the plan?" He said "Yes, it is right here" and he went over to a safe-vault, which was a large closet which had been converted into an enormous safe in his office to store documents. There were shelves inside this, and he walked inside and brought out the document that they had given him. ~~At a glance~~ At a glance, I saw that it was not the same size as the JSCP, which is on legal-length paper like all of the plans of the Joint Chiefs. This was an ordinary-sized paper. At ~~first~~ a glance it appeared to read like the JSCP, but I began to leaf through it and I went immediately to the critical sentence in the JSCP, "the secret" paragraph under the heading of "General War" where general war was defined. There was no definition. ~~in this document.~~

The heading in this paper said, "General War" and the first sentence was "In general war we execute the following plan, the SAC War Plan..." and so forth. But there was no definition of general war (just as there was not in the JSOP). I looked up and said to Gilpatric, "This is not the JSCP." He looked very confused and said "Well, it must be. They told me they would bring it, and I am sure they said to

me that this was the JSCP." I looked at it further and I realized what it must be; I said "This is a copy of the briefing that they gave you." He said "Really?" He looked quite put out. He repeated, "Well, they told me that it was the JSCP."

Then he said that he had told them he would write questions on the briefing and then they would set out to answer them. I suggested that what I should do is take the briefing with me, read it over and compare it to the JSCP and write some questions on it for him to send. I was at that moment working on another project which took a few days. Then I went to a separate office to work alone on these questions, taking the briefing they had given him and a copy of the JSCP, which I got from Colonel Lukman in the Air Force War Plans. I had told Gilpatric that I could get hold of the JSCP even though he couldn't. I then spent, in the end, almost a week writing a very long list of questions and compiling them and working them down. I finally wrote them in the form of assertions followed by a set of questions; a number of assertions and propositions followed by questions a, b, c, d, etc. The quotes purported to come or did come from the briefing that they had given him, so that there was no explicit indication that he had actually had the JSCP. But anyone who knew the JSCP would recognize that the person writing those questions was extremely familiar not only with the JSCP, but with all the planning and disputes

that lay behind it.

The first statement was, "You state in your briefing that each war plan is reviewed and approved by the next higher level of authority":

"(a) When was JSCP '61 reviewed and approved by Secretary of Defense Gates?

"(b) When in the normal planning process is it customary to submit the JSCP to the Secretary of Defense for review and approval?"

Honest answers to the above were, of course, "No" and "Never." From that point on the rest of the thirty to forty questions got increasingly rough, harder and harder for the Chiefs to answer honestly without simultaneously submitting their resignations. When I handed them to Gilpatric at the end of the week, he looked at them and said, "These are very penetrating questions." I really thought they were too tough for him to send, but he simply signed them and sent them to the Joint Chiefs, without changing a word and with a short deadline for them to answer.

An hour later Harry Rowan^e got a call from Gen. Jic Bonesteel, in the Joint Staff, generally regarded as the intellectual of the military staff. He said to Harry Rowen, very agitated, "Do you know anything about some questions we received down here?" Harry said "I might." Then he asked, "Who wrote them?" Harry refused to comment on that.

At one point I did take them over to show Komer, at the White House. He read them and said: "If these were Japanese generals, they would have to commit suicide when they received these questions."

As a result of all this, the actual JSCP did ultimately go to the White House and to the Secretary of Defense. At the White House, it was read by Carl Kaysen, who was by then Deputy to McGeorge Bundy. (Incidentally, McGeorge Bundy had taken on as an assistant to Kaysen a young, brash fellow who had previously worked for Rep. Kastenmaier named Mark Raskin who was to be assigned to arms control because Bundy had, allegedly, the idea that there should be a pacifist on the White House staff. I specifically asked Kaysen to be sure not to reveal these papers that I had written - including Rand papers which I had also written on these problems - to Raskin, whom I did not trust not to release them immediately to the New Republic. At that time I saw the President as the only individual who could successfully bring the military, and these plans, under political control; a public uproar, in which powerful Chairmen in Congress would take the side of the military against the President, would, I thought, make it more unlikely that he could do that.)

But I was never able to convince Kaysen that the President's time should be directly spent in reading the JSCP. The JSCP could have been read by any reasonably fast reader, let alone Kennedy, in an hour or two. But a

man at the McGeorge Bundy or Kaysen level thinks of his main task as being the management and economizing of the President's attention as well as his time. They could not be convinced that it was worth the President's time to focus his attention on what was "just a paper plan" by these idiots in the military. To some extent it was hard for me to communicate to Gilpatric, likewise, why it was so important for him to take on the JCS on these plans. At one point, much later, he remarked to me, "After all, those plans don't mean anything...When a crisis comes, such as the Berlin Crisis, we call them in, make them lay their plans on the table, and we re-write them."

I tried to explain to him that these plans affected operational planning and preparation in every lower level. Thus, although he could rewrite the paper plans when he got them, during a crisis, "the alternatives that you will have available, to choose among at that time, will be the alternatives that subordinate levels have 'bought' for you by their procurement, their training and preparations. You will have to choose among those alternatives then existing, and you will find - if you don't affect the plans long beforehand - that your hands are tied in the crisis to an extremely narrow set of alternatives."

I was never sure whether I fully convinced them of this. They were too impressed by their ability to exercise their influence at the crucial moment. And they were

extremely reluctant to take on these issues, in fights with the military, before the crisis arose, and thus to expend energy, create friction, suspicions and hostility, and possibly fights with Congress as the military turned to their allies in Congress, except under the pressure of an immediate crisis. My own feeling about the plan, by this time, was based on a great deal of practical knowledge as to how a piece of paper did affect operational procedures and expectations and behavior at lower levels.